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INTRODUCTION
According to some observers, the legal influence of the United States in the world is waning. 1 Where once the world looked to the U.S. Supreme Court as a guiding light, now foreign courts are increasingly disinterested in what our nine Justices have to say. 2 "One of our great exports used to be constitutional law," contends Anne-Marie Slaughter; "we are losing one of the greatest bully pulpits we have ever had." 3 Some commentators view this trend as disturbing evidence that the United States is losing its voice in an emerging international and transnational legal dialogue. 4 This does not appear to be a temporary fad: the U.S. Supreme Court's fading relevance in this global judicial dialogue is seen as a consequence of globalization. 5 In sum, "Judges are globalizing," 6 " [c] ourts are talking to one another all over the world," 7 and the United States is "out of step with [this] international mainstream." 8 There is empirical evidence offered to support this proposition. For example, the New York Times found that the rate of citation to the U.S. Supreme Court by the Supreme Court of Canada from 2002 to 2008 fell by fifty percent as compared to the number of citations from 1990 to 2002. 9 Particularly in human rights cases, foreign courts are now more likely to cite the European Court of Human Rights than the U.S. Supreme Court. 10 Politics is one explanation offered for this trend. 11 For instance, Thomas Ginsburg views the waning influence of the U.S. Supreme Court as the result of unpopular foreign policies undermining U.S. standing abroad. 12 Another reason suggested is that justices from high courts desire to give as well as take. 13 There are also admonitions that the United States ought to take part in the emerging international judicial dialogue. Diane Amann calls for " [j] ustices both to articulate when it is appropriate to look to external sources and to set forth a framework for consultation." 14 9. Liptak, supra note 1. 10. Id. (attributing the statement to Harold Koh, the Dean of the Yale School of Law). 11. Id. (suggesting that foreign high courts are often more liberal than the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, and as a result, are more likely to cite one another).
12. Id. (quoting Thomas Ginsburg, professor of comparative and international law at the University of Chicago).
13. See, e.g., Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 17 (1998) (stating that "the process of international influence has changed from reception to dialogue."); Liptak, supra note 1 (quoting Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak and Australian High Court Justice Michael Kirby).
14. Diane Marie Amann, International Law and the Rehnquist-Era Reversals, 94 GEO. L. J. 1319, 1319 (2006) . world legal community requires the United States Supreme Court to engage in the comparative constitutional dialogue." 15 Law student Rebecca Lefler speaks of the potential benefits that might flow from engaging in this judicial dialogue. 16 Claire L-Heureux-Dubé cites the lack of participation in this dialogue as an important reason for the U.S. Supreme Court's waning influence. 17 These assertions are hard to test. The purpose of this Note is to evaluate the claim that the U.S. Supreme Court is losing influence among other national and constitutional courts, and the explanations offered for this trend. Through the following discussion, this Note shows that the available data does not compel the conclusion that U.S. judicial influence is declining. The complete picture of the Supreme Court's influence on foreign courts is complex, and while there is certainly some support for the claims of diminished influence, there are reasons to be skeptical of the explanations for this trend identified above.
The discussion in Part I proceeds in three sections. The first section describes the U.S. Supreme Court's practice of citing to foreign precedent and the robust, continuing debate on this subject within the United States. The second section surveys the extent to which U.S. Supreme Court precedent is used abroad. 18 Because transnational judicial dialogue need not be confined to written judicial opinions, the third section provides a survey of the "informal" contacts-interactions beyond the context of adjudicating cases-between U.S. Supreme Court Justices and their colleagues and counterparts around the world. This section acknowledges that an empirical citation study alone, though important, is likely insufficient to fully capture the possible influence of the U.S. Supreme Court abroad. 19 16. See, e.g., Lefler, supra note 4, at [190] [191] ("Learning from other countries' experiences can only enhance and clarify what is best within our own legal system; ignoring the decisions and opinions from around the world is turning our backs on a valuable jurisprudential resource.").
17. L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 13, at 37 (" [T] he failure of the United States Supreme Court to take part in the international dialogue among the courts of the world, particularly on human rights issues, is contributing to a growing isolation and diminished influence.").
18. As will be discussed below, there is relatively little data exclusively on the U.S. Supreme Court. To supplement this deficiency, I will also discuss data on citation to U.S. courts in general, while noting the percentage of such citations that refer to the Supreme Court in particular.
19. In other words, the specific influence of a given case or a given court may only be measured by way of counting citations and references. However, the possibility that interactions with fellow jurists from around the world will, if only by "osmosis," exert some influence on the U.S. Justices is too plausible to simply discount. Therefore, the final diminishing U.S. influence in light of Part I, critiques the elucidations articulated by Slaughter, Ginsburg, Choudhry, and others identified in the Introduction, and provides alternative explanations for trends in citation to U.S. authority abroad. This project is not exhaustive but rather a first step. The goal is to introduce an element of verifiable metrics into a conversation that has been dominated by anecdotal evidence in the hope that further empirical study will be conducted.
I. MEASURING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S INFLUENCE ABROAD
The influence the U.S. Supreme Court supposedly once wielded, and supposedly is now losing, is most often cast as the preeminence of U.S. jurisprudential ideas within the emerging global judicial community. 20 The dialogue that characterizes contemporary transnational judicial interaction represents a paradigm shift from the top-down dictation of the past to an exchange among peers. 21 Therefore, to determine the extent to which ideas are exchanged, we must first determine what methods of exchange are used by the global judicial community. This requires consideration of the role of foreign jurisprudential ideas in the United States and the influence of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudential ideas abroad. Dialogue, after all, is a give and take, 22 and it is only logical to examine both sides of the conversation. This paper approaches the issue primarily by analyzing the practice of citation and reference to foreign precedent by national Supreme Courts. 23 21. Indeed, it is the two-way street that distinguishes contemporary judicial dialogue and globalization from the previous force pushing judicial interaction-imperial domination and the supremacy of imperial courts to those of local jurisdictions. For discussion of this difference, see Buxbaum, supra note 20, at 185.
22. As noted above, see, for example, L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 13, at 17 (stating that "the process of international influence has changed from reception to dialogue."); Liptak, supra note 1 (quoting Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak and Australian High Court Justice Michael Kirby).
23. For the purposes of this paper "foreign law," "foreign precedent," and "foreign case law" are synonymous. That is, the phrase "foreign precedent" refers to published judicial opinions of courts outside the United States, or from a jurisdiction other than that being discussed. Because the discussion centers on the context of judicial practice, this phraseology does not refer to statutes, administrative regulations, or any form of non-something to the person citing, and presumably [the author intends them to] have some meaning to a reader." 24 That is, "citation serves the purpose of locating the immediate decision and reasoning within the context of [other] decisions." 25 In addition, references to cases and courts are quantifiable and may be analyzed empirically, affording a useful metric for the discussion at hand. For example, it is possible to determine the frequency with which a foreign court or case is cited. Furthermore, absent explicit reference in a judicial opinion, it is impossible to determine whether and to what extent foreign precedent was influential or even considered by the deciding court.
A. Use of Foreign Precedent by the U.S. Supreme Court
One element of the emerging judicial dialogue is the demonstrable influence of foreign precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court. A brief survey will suffice, because Professor Steven Calabresi and Stephanie Zimdahl have already completed a thorough study of this topic. 26 As an initial matter, U.S. Supreme Court references to foreign sources of law have been far more frequent than might be commonly known. 27 While the practice may have become more prevalent in the twentieth century, 28 it has always been a feature of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. 29 In their review, Calabresi and Zimdahl identify five common situations in which the Court has cited or referred to foreign judicial argumentation (including briefs and court documents, as well as law review articles and other academic works).
24 Unfortunately, Calabresi and Zimdahl do not provide an empirical tally of the cases citing foreign law. Rather, their work focuses on an examination only of "striking" cases in which the Supreme Court has referred to foreign law. Id. at 754. In pursuit of a more complete picture of the influence of foreign precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court, it would likely prove useful to have quantitative data regarding citation to foreign authority, including a breakdown by Justice.
27. Id. at 907 (concluding, after a lengthy review of over 200 years of Supreme Court practice, that the Court's reference to foreign law is rather commonplace).
28. Id. (arguing that "the pace of the Court's reliance on foreign sources of law has picked up in the last sixty-five years . . . .").
29. Id. at 838-39 (noting that research demonstrates a steady escalation of references to foreign precedent over the history of the Court).
law: 1) cases involving determinations of reasonableness; 2) cases where the Court has sought guidance in interpreting ambiguous language; 3) criminal cases, which account for many of the Court's references to foreign precedent generally; 4) cases where the Court has sought to provide logical reinforcement of its decisions; and 5) cases where the Court needs empirical support for arguments about possible consequences of proposed legal reforms-i.e. to demonstrate the potential impact of legal rules by noting how they have played out in other jurisdictions. 30 Calabresi and Zimdahl note two categories of cases in which the Supreme Court has rarely referred to foreign precedent, namely cases hinging on interpretations of the original meaning of the Constitution and cases rooted in the distinctive structure of the U.S. government and its particular form of federalism. 31 This history notwithstanding, contemporary reference to foreign precedent by the U.S. Supreme Court is controversial, particularly in the adjudication of constitutional issues, and has been debated at length in scholarly literature. 32 Scalia agree that there are certain instances where citing to foreign law in Supreme Court opinions is appropriate, but on the whole, Justice Breyer is supportive and Justice Scalia is critical of the practice.
Justice Breyer generally supports citing to foreign precedent in opinions, though he is careful to note that foreign precedent in no way binds American courts. 38 In his remarks, Justice Breyer outlines three rationales in support of the limited comparative practice he proposes. First, he argues that citing foreign precedent could bolster fledgling democratic institutions by lending the Court's prestige to their efforts. 39 Second, he suggests that some issues are better understood as "lawrelated human question [s] ," as opposed to technically legal questions. Such "law-related human questions" merit reference to the ways other human beings (i.e. foreign judges) have addressed them. 40 Third, Justice Breyer argues that reference to foreign precedent can help inform the judicial process by illustrating the possible implications or consequences of a particular decision. 41 Michael Kirby, former Justice of the High Court of Australia, has made similar arguments. He suggests that, ("In some foreign countries, people are struggling to establish institutions that will help them protect democracy and human rights . . . . They want to demonstrate the importance of having independent judges enforce constitutionally protected human rights . . . . And if we sometimes refer to their decisions, the references may help those struggling institutions.").
40. See id. at 528 (giving Breyer's statement that "American and foreign judges alike are human beings using similar legal texts, dealing with a somewhat similar human problem"; thus justifying "reaching out to those other nations, reading their decisions . . . even though they cannot determine the outcome of a question that arises under the American Constitution.").
41. See id. at 537 ("If, for example, a foreign court, in a particular decision, had shown that a particular interpretation of similar language in a similar document had had an adverse affect on free expression, to read that decision might help me apply the American Constitution."). In doing so, Justice Kirby notes that foreign judges are not showing improper deference, loyalty, or obedience to the rulings of foreign courts. 43 Rather, foreign precedent concerning related or analogous problems arising under domestic law is seen as "helpful and informative and therefore useful in the development of the municipal decisionmaker's own opinions." 44 Addressing critics of the practice, Justice Kirby argues that reference to foreign precedent merely "helps the municipal decision-maker to see his or her problem in a wider context," a function similar to that Justice Breyer ascribes to citations of law review articles and treatises. 45 Justices Breyer and Scalia agree that citing foreign precedent might be justified to show that the Court's adoption of a given rule would not lead to disastrous results. 46 This minor point of agreement notwithstanding, Justice Scalia is critical of the practice of citing foreign law. First, he argues that citation to foreign precedent lends itself to manipulation. That is, with a world of jurisprudence from which to draw, a judge can almost always find some precedent supporting his or her desired outcome-a kind of judicial cherry picking. 47 Second, he contends that American judges do not understand the context in which foreign decisions were rendered, leading to inappropriate comparisons. 48 Finally, Justice Scalia argues that foreign law is irrelevant, since the Constitution was not meant to grow or change, but to remain a static baseline against which legislative acts are measured. John Greaney, former Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, is similarly wary of citing to foreign precedent. First, even contextual reference to foreign law disregards what Justice Greaney terms the "uniqueness principle": the idea that no matter how similar another country's law might be, each state has a cultural and social milieu that shapes and defines its laws. 50 In addition, differences in the purposes and processes of judicial selection have an impact on what he terms the "art and science of judging." 51 The resulting differences therefore render practices and decisions of foreign courts inapposite. 52 Finally, Justice Greaney echoes Justice Scalia's worry about jurisprudential cherry picking-what Justice Greaney describes as jurisprudential "opportunism that is incongruent with American constitutional adjudication." 53 Considering the role cast for foreign precedent by its proponents and the trepidation of its opponents, one may tentatively conclude that the influence of foreign jurisprudence on the U.S. Supreme Court is limited to a modest background role. Based on the descriptions offered by Justice Breyer and Justice Kirby as to the use of foreign precedent, the influence of foreign precedent is perhaps less than the volume 54 of the debate might indicate. Certainly some shared ideas are influential, but this influence seems limited to providing background information, rather than serving a dispositive role in a given case.
Lastly, it may be tempting to infer from the preceding discussion that the hostility of some prominent U.S. judges to the use of foreign precedent may leave foreign jurists less inclined to cite U.S. precedent. However, that conclusion is premature, and to accurately assess the extent of the U.S. Supreme Court's influence abroad, it is necessary to examine the use of U.S. precedent overseas. (2006) (mentioning that while selective manipulation of citation from a home jurisdiction is also possible, the practice "can be more readily detected").
54. "Volume" refers to both the vitriol of some critiques, and the sheer amount of material addressing the subject.
B. Use of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Abroad
In contrast to the vigorous debate that characterizes the U.S. Supreme Court's use of foreign case law, many courts in other countries take a more expansive view of the use of foreign precedent. For example, in Australia, 55 Canada, 56 India, 57 Israel, 58 New Zealand, 59 Singapore, 60 and South Africa, 61 to name but a few, reference to U.S. precedent is not uncommon. 62 Many of the judges in these countries offer justifications for their comparative endeavors similar to those advanced by Justices Breyer and Kirby. 63 In Canada, citation to U.S. precedent is seen as "an aspect of a more general trend" of comparative exercise. 64 Indeed, the entire practice of referring to foreign precedent is merely reflective of the "legal cosmopolitanism" that Canadian jurists have found to be "a valuable source of enrichment and greater sophistication." 65 In Canada comparative practice has been used to provide important background on legal questions via consideration of "the successes and failures of various approaches" taken by other states and is driven by a desire "to benefit from expertise acquired [by longstanding non-Canadian constitutional jurisprudence]." 66 Justices from Australia have advanced similar arguments. For example, Justice Kirby has been an outspoken advocate of comparative reference to foreign precedent. 67 As he notes in a recent article, references to foreign precedent by the High Court of Australia are quite uncontroversial. Such references are used because they "have been found helpful and informative and therefore useful in the development of the municipal decision-maker's own opinions concerning apparently similar problems presented by the municipal constitution or other laws." 68 And while reference to international law in certain contexts may be controversial, 69 the utility of referring to jurisprudence of other countries as a means of elucidating the meaning of the Australian Constitution remains unquestioned. 70 Although courts in many countries commonly refer to foreign precedent, Canada and Australia are particularly useful for measuring the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court abroad. Of obvious benefit is the fact that these countries speak English, 71 but of even more benefit is the fact that observers have extensively studied and documented the practices of the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia with special attention to the citation of U.S. precedent. Section B will end by noting any conclusions that can be drawn from the discussion, with an eye to addressing arguments that the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court is waning due to hostility toward comparative practice. 72
Canadian Reference to U.S. Precedent and to the U.S. Supreme Court
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, largely as a result of the country's history, Canadian courts have long cited foreign precedent 73 84 The pertinent differences are noted in the review below.
a. By the Numbers
As an introductory remark, and to provide some context for the following discussion, it merits observing that the Supreme Court of 74 Canada cites itself more often than any other source of authority. 85 Canadian appellate courts are cited about one-third as often as SCC precedent, and Canadian trial courts are cited half as often as Canadian appellate courts, or one-sixth as often as SCC precedent. 86 U.K. precedents are cited one-twelfth as often as SCC authority; U.S. precedents are cited half as often as U.K. authority, or one-twentyfourth as often as SCC authority; and other authorities are cited oneforty-eighth as often as SCC precedent. 87 The total number of judicial citations counted in the combined McCormick studies is 53,602. 88 According that cite to some U.S. decision during the pre-Charter period (1876-1983), U.S. authority accounted for roughly 9% of all SCC citations. 92 Analyzing McCormick 2's data (2000-2008) using the same method, one finds that 14% of the total cases reference the U.S. Supreme Court, a large subsection of the 20% of total cases that reference any U.S. authority. 93 McCormick 1 provides ratios of the SCC's citation to its own precedent relative to citation to U.S. Supreme Court decisions by casetype. 94 Overall, the SCC cited itself eight times for every one cite to the U.S. Supreme Court; the same ratio appeared in those cases identified as Charter cases. 95 The ratio for public law and criminal law cases stands at ten SCC citations for every one U.S. Supreme Court citation, 96 and in private law cases the ratio stands below four SCC citations for every one U.S. Supreme Court citation. 97 It is interesting to note that for the period of the McCormick 1 study, private law cases constituted a growing segment of the SCC docket. U.S. state court decisions accounted for three-fifths of the citations to U.S. authority in private law cases. 98 Just under half of all citations to the U.S. Supreme Court appear in Charter cases, but, in Charter cases, citations to the U.S. Supreme Court represent 75% of the total number of citations to U.S. authority. 99 
b. Trends
During the pre-Charter era, Bushnell observed that the SCC cited significantly more U.S. authority prior to the early 1900s, with a resurgence from 1970 to 1983, the last decade of the study. 100 The period exhibiting the greatest number of citations to U.S. precedent was from 1876 to 1886, during which time 19% of SCC decisions included some reference to U.S. authority. 101 was new, it looked abroad more frequently to find precedent with which to adjudicate. 102 Citation to U.S. authority increased from 1945 to 1994 (beginning at 1.5% of all citations, and ending at 6.87%), 103 with a spike in 1990. 104 It is noteworthy that during this same period, the SCC cited all authority more frequently, hence "American references represent [ 
c. Other Explanations and Conclusions
Although some of the preceding discussion considers citation to U.S. precedent in general, the SCC has always cited to the U.S. Supreme Court more than any other U.S. court. 111 While citation to the U.S. Supreme Court only rose far above citation to other U.S. courts during the Charter era, the overall percentages remained fairly consistent over both McCormick's studies. From 1945 to 1994, the percentage breakdown of citation to the U.S. Supreme Court, other federal courts, and state courts was approximately 50%, 24%, and 26%, respectively. 112 From 2000 to 2008, the percentage breakdown was roughly 47%, 23%, and 30%, respectively. 113 This data allows one to draw conclusions, discussed below, about the influence of the Supreme Court by inference, even when the data speaks only of citations to U.S. authority in general.
Legal education is one commonly suggested reason for the general increase in citation to U.S. authority over the time periods studied. Proponents argue that Canadian judges and lawyers who receive at least some of their training in the United States are more inclined to both cite and base arguments on U.S. authority. 114 Similarly, Gerard La Forest, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, posited the U.S. legal education of Canadian legal scholars as one possible reason why Canadian jurists commonly cite U.S. authority. 115 (1966) . The advent of electronic databases, such as Westlaw and LexisNexis in the United States, and the World Legal Information Institute, and the practice of some courts posting published decisions online have made far more international law and foreign law available to courts around the globe. As a result, it is unclear whether the availability of foreign precedent during law school is determinative of a lawyer's subsequent willingness to cite foreign law. Examples of courts posting decisions online include the U.S. Supreme Court, European Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Yet of the sixty-two Justices to sit on the SCC during the period Bushnell studied, six were educated in the United States-five at Harvard, and one at the University of Michigan. 117 Moreover, according to McCormick 1, the education explanation is not supported by the data. McCormick notes that only four of the top eighteen SCC Justices (ranked by their frequency of citation to U.S. authority) and only one of the top six received any training in the United States. 118 These U.S.-trained SCC Justices 119 account for only one-sixth of the "judge years" accounted for in the McCormick 1 study, and only 32.4% of U.S. citations overall. 120 McCormick 2 echoes this finding and suggests that the practice of citing U.S. authority began with justices familiar with U.S. authority from their legal training and spread to other justices. 121 When McCormick 2 was published, "for almost the first time since the Second World War, there [was] not a single judge on the SCC with a law degree from an American University." 122 What, then, can be said about the overall influence of U.S. precedent on Canadian jurisprudence? It seems clear that " 117. Bushnell, supra note 81, at 169. During the editing process, I was asked to account for the potential impact of judicial clerks who may have received their legal education in the United States. The subject of clerks is arguably irrelevant to the discussion presented here for two reasons. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that the role of judicial clerks in the drafting of opinions is that of a ghostwriter, not a principal author. A clerk's role is to prepare a draft as though the judge had written it. Secondly, and most importantly, the final published opinion will include only those citations the judge has determined are appropriate. It is ultimately the judge's opinion, without so much as a footnote identifying the clerk who prepared the first draft. The idea that relatively inexperienced law clerks have so much influence that they shape their judge's citation practices is dubious at best. It is hard to imagine Justice Scalia, for example, authoring an opinion citing foreign law in a manner similar to Justice Kirby simply because an enterprising law clerk thought to include the citations in a rough draft. I recognize that this discussion assumes the process of judicial opinion drafting in other countries is similar to that common in the United States. This assumption may be unwarranted, but is a topic well beyond the scope of this essay.
118 effect, the upward trend of SCC citation to U.S. authority during most of the twentieth century cautions against reading too much into the more recent, modest decline. Correlations do not prove causation, and perhaps the dip in U.S. citations in the early twenty-first century is better explained by a maturing SCC jurisprudence, rather than an effect caused by U.S. hostility to comparative exercise, or political disagreements. Thus, there is reason to be skeptical of claims that any diminishing influence is correctable through increased U.S. participation in the emerging transnational judicial dialogue, at least vis-à-vis Canada.
Australian Reference to U.S. Precedent
Like Canada, Australia has a long history of citing foreign precedent in general, and U.S. precedent in particular. Both countries share a history as part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 124 and like Canada, Australian citation to U.S. precedent began roughly the same time as the last bonds of colonialism were loosening. 125 Additionally, there exists abundant anecdotal evidence describing the High Court of Australia's (HCA) citation to U.S. and other foreign precedent. 126 There are also quantitative studies of the frequency with which U.S. authority is cited by the HCA.
In addition to brief discussions in larger works, 127 Paul von Nessen has tallied and analyzed HCA citation to U.S. authority over the last century, reviewing the practice from 1901 to 2002 in two separate papers. 128 In his reviews, von Nessen used two slightly different 124 years-1920, 1940, 1960, 1980, 1996) . The exception to this proposition, as Smyth notes, is the year 1940. Id. at 99. The data is reproduced in part below. Id. at 98 (omitting the more detailed breakdown by court for Australia, the United Kingdom, and "Other" 143 During that period, constitutional law cases accounted for the majority of U.S. citations. In fact, there were roughly three times as many constitutional law cases as criminal law cases, the next highest area of law. 144 The percentage of cases from 1901 to 1990 citing some U.S. authority, broken down by category, are as follows: constitutional law: 54.7%; public law: 8.8%; contracts/commercial: 3.5%; criminal: 5.2%; tort: 5%; other common law: 15.6%; other statutory: 5.5%; miscellaneous: 1.7%. 145 Von Nessen's studies also present some anecdotal evidence of the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the HCA's practice of citing to U.S. authority. For example, von Nessen notes that "[i]nitially, many of the Justices of the High Court (including a number actually involved in the drafting of the Australian Constitution) preferred to embark upon interpretation of a written constitution with guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, a tribunal with over a century 's -1910 565  404  46  23  7  9  22  47  7  1911-1920 474  341  46  11  22  2  30  16  6  1921-1930 273  203  6  21  8  0  28  5  2  1931-1940 269  130  7  16  36  7  22  45  6  1941-1950 366  284  29  6  0  7  16  11  13  1951-1960 296  190  22  4  42  3  31  3  1  1961-1970 190  95  14  6  37  8  14  16  0  1971-1980 329  92  52  12  10  30  90  17  26  1981-1990 1096  370  118  37  31  134  349  53  4  Totals  3,858  2,109  340  136  193  200  602  213  65 144. See id. 145. Id. at 900 graph 1.
process." 146 By the 1920s, von Nessen notes, this preference shifted, and a majority of the HCA started viewing U.K. interpretive principles as more applicable than U.S. methods. 147 Other possible reasons for the attitude shift away from the U.S. Supreme Court include differences of opinion regarding changes in the U.S. Supreme Court's views of federalism and the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence during the New Deal era. 148
b. Trends
The twentieth century saw changes in the practice and output of the High Court of Australia that had a noticeable impact on the HCA's practice of citing foreign law. Except for citations to U.K. law, which remained relatively stable over the century, 149 High Court citation to U.S., New Zealand, and Canadian precedents all increased substantially beginning in the 1970s and continuing until 1999. 150 U.S. citations appeared in 14% of High Court cases between 1903 and 1910, dipping to 9% between 1951 and 1960, rising to 13% between 1971 and 1980, then spiking to 25% between 1981 and 1990, and 41% between 1991 and 1999. 151 By comparison, citations to Canadian and New Zealand authorities followed a slightly different, though consistently upward trend, beginning low (4% and 5% respectively) from 1903 to 1910, and gradually increasing between 1911 and 1980, before spiking in the years 1981 to 1990 (21% and 20% respectively) and 1991 to 1999 (37% and 33% respectively). 152 Turning to U.S. precedents in particular, von Nessen's second study shows that HCA citation to U.S. precedent varied quite a bit in terms of the volume and area of law between 1901 and 2002. 153 Even so, a significant majority of the cases citing U.S. authority were categorized as constitutional law cases. Because the U.S. Constitution provided a model for parts of the Australian Constitution, it is unsurprising that the HCA would seek to learn from U. Von Nessen's first study found a significant increase in the number of citations to U.S. authority beginning in 1971. 155 This upward trend reached a high water mark between 1981 and 1990. 156 One explanation is that between 1975 and 1985, appeals to the Privy Council in London ceased entirely, leaving the HCA as the final level of appeal for all cases in Australia. 157 This shift enabled greater judicial independence and might explain the increase in the citation to U.S. precedent overall. 158 In addition, it is important to note that the increased caseload of the HCA "would, consequently, be a contributing factor in relation to increased use of United States cases." 159 Although the HCA most often cited U.S. authority in constitutional law cases, "[t]he relative predomination of constitutional issues in the early decades was replaced in later years with a broadening range of legal areas." 160 This change occurred within a larger trend of citation to U.S. precedent, which declined twenty years after the enactment of Australia's Constitution in 1920, and then increased in the late twentieth century. 161 Reflecting both the larger trend and the decline in the number of constitutional issues, the percentage of constitutional law cases in which the HCA cited U.S. authority dropped from 71.5% to 33.7% between the first and last decade of the first von Nessen study. 162 Further, from 1991 to 2002, 35.3% of the U.S. precedents cited were constitutional law cases, while the number of common law and statutory law cases continued to rise, even as compared to the last period of the study. 163 One explanation for this trend is that the HCA used U.S. precedents as a starting point but gradually shifted to using domestic precedents once these became established. 164 Far from an aberration, the significant uptick in HCA citation to U.S. precedent, noted at the end of von Nessen 1, continued through the period reviewed in von Nessen 2. 166 Between 1991 and 2000, the HCA cited U.S. authority roughly 211 times per year, and roughly 310 times per year between 2001 and 2002. 167 By contrast, the HCA cited U.S. precedents an average of 109 times annually between 1981 and 1990, and roughly fifty-six times annually from 1901 to 1910, the two highest decades in the initial von Nessen period of study. 168 Thus, as of 2002, there appeared to be a steady upward trend in the number of U.S. court decisions cited by the HCA. 169 This trend appears related to the HCA's increasing consideration of U.S. authority in a growing range of legal areas. For example, the HCA's citation to U.S. precedent increased in cases touching on human rights and international obligations, as well as common law doctrines of contracts and torts. 170 Two reasons suggested for this development are the end of Privy Council appeals from Australia, and the increased willingness of the HCA to cite foreign precedent. 171 In addition, the HCA recently began deciding cases based on rights it has found implied in the language of the Australian Constitution. 172 Because, as previously mentioned, the Australian Constitution is based on elements of the U.S. Constitution, the HCA might find U.S. constitutional cases newly relevant, and therefore cite to them. 173 
c. Other Explanations and Conclusions
As shown above, the High Court of Australia's citation to U.S. authority constitutes only a small percentage of its total number of citations to authority. Citation to foreign courts (excluding U.K. courts) has never accounted for even as much as 6% of total citations by the HCA, 174 law countries. 175 In absolute numbers, the HCA has cited secondary sources significantly more than it has cited U.S. authority. 176 One explanation for the infrequent citation to U.S. authority is that citation practices depend on the historical, social, and cultural milieu described by Justice Greaney. 177 For example, the decrease in references to U.S. precedents beginning in the 1920s is arguably a result of the HCA's determination that Australian legal culture is "more appropriately guided by British than by United States practice." 178 Likewise, it is plausible that the HCA rarely cited U.S. authority prior to the 1970s, in part, because of differing views on the role of the judiciary. 179 Furthermore, the disregard for U.S. constitutional precedent during the early and mid-twentieth century arguably resulted from differing views about federalism and the relative power of the national government, which greatly increased during the New Deal era. 180 Indeed, such considerations also provide a plausible explanation for the differing rates of citation to U.S. authority in each area of law. For example, one reason for the lower incidence of common law and statutory cases citing U.S. authority is that historical and structural considerations rendered U.S. case law unhelpful to the HCA. 181 Regarding the common law, for much of the period studied, the HCA could not diverge significantly from U.K. law because of the possibility of appeal to the Privy Council. 182 Regarding statutory cases, the HCA generally went in a different direction than U.S. courts for a variety of reasons. Prior to the mid-1970s, Australia borrowed little from U.S. legislative models, rendering U.S. authority on statutory issues of little help to the HCA. 183 Additionally, prior to 1981, Australian courts were inclined to strictly construe legislative acts, and the HCA did not consider the same range of constitutional issues, like those in the U.S. Von Nessen suggests that the increased citation to U.S. precedent beginning in the late twentieth century is a result of the HCA's comparative impulse, rather than the novelty of certain legal questions. This argument is based on the recognition that "as globally common issues arise, consideration of the broadest range of potential solutions and approaches to these common problems is not only permissible, but advisable." 185 In his view, the data "is consistent with the conclusion that the High Court now accepts the value of a global perspective, and that this sustains the increased use of United States authority." 186 Whatever the reason underlying the clear upward trend in HCA citation to U.S. authority, the data cuts against claims of a diminishing influence of U.S. authority among foreign jurists.
Loose ends
High courts of other nations frequently cite U.S. judicial decisions, at least in relative terms. However, the overall practice of citing foreign authority is fairly limited. This is true even in countries that, for reasons of history, proximity, and constitutional similarities, might seem logically predisposed to cite U.S. precedents. As the studies of Canadian citation to U.S. precedent show, "the diffusion of citations [to U.S. courts does not] fit particularly well with the overtones of the 'emerging judicial community' literature." 187 And, as noted in the discussion of Australian citation, even secondary sources are more frequently cited than cases from non-U.K. foreign courts, let alone just U.S. courts. 188 That being said, within the relatively small sliver of citations to foreign precedent in both Canada and Australia, U.S. authority is second only to U.K. authority in citation frequency. 189 Thus, there is clearly merit to observations that the United States is an "exporter" of jurisprudence and jurisprudential ideas, 190 as well as to claims that the U.S. Supreme Court wields some measure of influence on national courts in other countries. 191 Based on the SCC and HCA citation analysis discussed in this note, claims that U.S. jurisprudential influence is waning seems speculative or anecdotal, rather than data driven.
As noted above, the relative influence (measured by citation analysis) of U.S. authority, and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular, on the Supreme Court of Canada has recently declined. At the same time, the data available regarding the citation practices of the High Court of Australia indicate that citation to U.S. authority in general is increasing. A review of how U.S. authority is used, as opposed to how often, will help determine the full extent of the influence the U.S. Supreme Court wields abroad, as well as any changes to it over time. Unfortunately, available studies of "how" are less thorough than the studies of "how often." 192
C. Informal Judicial Meetings and Exchanges
Though important, empirical study alone is insufficient to fully capture the U.S. Supreme Court's influence abroad. Advances in telecommunications have placed many court decisions at the fingertips of judges the world over, enabling a curious jurist to access decisions almost as soon as they are released. 193 Beyond technology, it is also important to consider the "informal" contacts-i.e. interactions beyond the context of adjudicating casesbetween U.S. Supreme Court Justices and their colleagues and counterparts around the world. In addition to occasionally citing the opinions of their colleagues, "[j]udges are also meeting face to face" 194 and "are getting to know each other better as they interact at conferences and in personal meetings. . . ." 195 These informal contacts between judges provide opportunities for judges to engage in dialogue aside from citation of foreign law, undermining claims that the U.S. Supreme Court is "out of step" with the transnational judicial dialogue. 196 Anne-Marie Slaughter has expertly catalogued many 192 . See, e.g., Bushnell, supra note 81, at 161-63 tbl.3 (breaking down SCC citations into five classifications: Used, Same, Qualified, Special, Differ. By far the most predominant category is that of "Used" -"[t]he characteristic of this category is that there is nothing in the judgment to indicate that anything out of the ordinary is happening. Cases from the United States appear to be used as the judge would use any case he considered an authority."); see also McCormick 2, supra note 24, at 114-25 (including a review of how U.S. authority is used in specific cases; however, this review lacks the same level of thoroughness as McCormick's empirical studies of citations).
193. See footnote text supra note 114 (discussing electronic databases, and providing some examples of internet-based legal resources and courts posting their decisions online).
194 examples of such contacts, 197 and the following merely supplements her valuable work. Slaughter observes that judges around the world are meeting at inter-judicial conferences, 198 via judicial exchanges, 199 and through conferences sponsored by law schools and NGOs. 200 One prominent example is the gathering of the Organization of Supreme Courts of the Americas (OSCA), hosted in Washington, D.C. in 1995. Chaired by thenChief Justice William Rehnquist, the meeting boasted attendees from twenty-five countries representing North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. 201 Some of these experiences have been noted in judicial opinions. 202 In addition, "[a] flood of foundation and government funding for judicial seminars, training programs, and educational materials under the banner [of] 'rule of law' programs has significantly expanded the opportunities for cross-fertilization." 203 Furthermore, U.S. Supreme Court Justices have given at least seven speeches in four countries over the last ten years. 204 Some Justices have engaged in literary projects with counterparts from abroad, 205 and the Court has paid tribute to fallen colleagues abroad. 206 
II. (BIG) "GRAINS OF SALT"
While not exhaustive, the data available from citation analysis challenges the view that the U.S. Supreme Court wields diminished influence abroad. That view appears to be largely based on anecdotal evidence, and the preceding sections are intended to provide some much-needed context in which to accurately assess these assertions. By focusing on measurable indicators and accounting for more intangible avenues of influence and exchange, the foregoing has shed some light on what influence the U.S. Supreme Court actually wields in the emerging global judicial community. This Note has reviewed the frequency of citation to U.S. precedent in Canada and Australia and placed that data in perspective vis-à-vis frequency of citation to both foreign and municipal precedent. In addition, the discussion presented an overview of the various activities the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court engage in that place them in contact with counterparts and colleagues across the globe.
Regarding the contention of waning Supreme Court influence abroad, an analysis of actual citation practice undermines the validity of its contenders' anecdotal evidence. As noted, in absolute numbers the citation to foreign precedent by the SCC and HCA represents only a fraction of the total number of citations to judicial authority employed by these two courts. Thus, any measurable influence occurs within a relatively minor segment of the jurisprudence of these courts, and even then the data does not necessitate the conclusion that U.S. influence is waning. Indeed, in the case of Australia, the number of citations to U.S. authority trends up.
Citation to U.S. authority by the SCC remained fairly consistent from 1945 to 2008, and citation to U.S. authority trended up between 1945 and 1994. The fact that SCC citation to U.S. Supreme Court authority most frequently referred to decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts undermines claims that citation to the U.S. Supreme Court has diminished because of political differences over the last decade. Nor does the SCC's slight decrease in U.S. Supreme Court citations and slight increase in U.S. state court citations necessarily speak to a diminishing influence of the U.S. Supreme Court. This is especially true in light of changes in the type of cases appearing on the SCC's docket.
One could reasonably conclude that changes in citation to the U.S. Supreme Court are a result of municipal law maturing to the point at which continued reference to foreign authority, whether from the United States or elsewhere, is less helpful than reliance on domestic precedent. 207 Such an inference does not necessarily speak to a diminishing influence, at least no more so than it speaks to a diminishing need for direct reliance on foreign authority to decide cases involving established legal principles. Perhaps if citation to foreign authority were shown to increase, but citation to the U.S. Supreme Court dropped off in favor of other non-municipal authority, the claims of diminishing influence would appear more credible. That is not the case at present, at least with regard to the U.S. Supreme Court's influence on Canadian jurisprudence. Rather, concluding that municipal jurists have simply opted for established domestic authority over foreign decisions may even speak to a lasting influence, if the domestic principles were initially derived from foreign sources.
The data pertaining to Australia cut more strikingly against the claims of diminishing influence. Citation to U.S. authority, and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular, represents a small segment of the HCA's overall citation. Indeed, citation to non-municipal authority other than U.K. decisions has been consistently outpaced by citation to secondary sources. For example, in 1996 citation to secondary sources accounted for 10.5% of all citations by the HCA, as compared to citation to non-U.K. foreign authority accounting for only 5.4%.
Yet within this small segment of HCA citation, the data reflects a possible increase in U.S. influence. Unlike the citation practice of the SCC, the HCA demonstrated an upward trend in the citation to U.S. There are other reasons, in addition to the conclusions drawn from the data above, that counsel skepticism of claims that the U.S. Supreme Court is losing its influence. While this paper has focused on citation analysis as a verifiable metric to use in assessing the relative influence of the U.S. Supreme Court, citation analysis alone may not account for the full picture. Influence may come from conversations at conferences, speaking engagements, and through non-judicial projects. 208 Influence might also come from simply staying current with jurisprudential developments abroad. Indeed, despite disagreeing about citing foreign law in opinions, Justices Breyer and Scalia agree on the potential utility of keeping informed of the decisions of other national and constitutional courts. 209 Also, given the small number of citations under discussion, and the views professed by Justices and academics advocating comparativism, the precise nature of the Court's influence is ambiguous. To be sure, any precedent considered will have some measure of influence, even if only serving as background. But given the overall context of the comparative exercise and the manner in which foreign precedent is apparently used, precisely what influence the U.S. Supreme Court is supposed to be losing is unclear. To hear the Justices of the SCC and HCA discuss their use of foreign authority, 210 or to consider Justice Breyer's views of appropriate use of comparative materials, 211 one wonders what it was the United States was exporting. 212 Rather than actual jurisprudence, 213 perhaps it was a model of constitutionalism. 214 If so, then it is difficult to see how U.S. influence diminishes by the exercise of a uniquely American contribution-judicial review 215 -merely because others do not routinely consult the results.
If the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court is waning, there are explanations for the phenomenon that are not tied to the Court's apparent hostility to citing foreign authority. As noted by Justice Greaney, law almost always emerges from a specific context, and this background shapes the ways in which courts apply the law to the cases before them. 216 Such a view could explain some of the ebb and flow of U.S. Supreme Court citations in foreign courts over time. For example, when facing novel constitutional cases, a court might be more inclined to look abroad to more experienced tribunals for guidance. One would anticipate an increase in the citation to the U.S. Supreme Court when addressing novel constitutional instruments or issues, and that such citations would recede in favor of reliance on domestic precedent once it is established. Smithey arrived at this conclusion in her analysis of the citation practices of Canadian and South African high courts. 217 And, as discussed above, Bushnell suggests a similar explanation for the relatively high frequency of U.S. citations early in the SCC's history. 218 The general trends in citation to U.S. precedent abroad could also be considered a reflection of historical developments. For instance, Bushnell argues compellingly that the early willingness to rely on U.S. precedent by the SCC may have resulted from the prevailing view of the common law at the time. 219 Von Nessen highlights as a turning point the determination by the HCA that Australian jurisprudence was more similar to, and therefore better guided by, U.K. courts than by U.S. courts. 220 And McCormick contends that the sharp increase in citation to U.S. precedent in the 1990s validates authors who projected that the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms would be accompanied by an increased reliance on U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. 221 Similarly, skepticism should extend to assertions that the United States risks lagging behind global jurisprudence by failing to partake in the transnational judicial dialogue happening via citation. While the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court may presently debate the merits of comparative jurisprudence, the history depicted by Calabresi and Zimdahl clearly demonstrates that citation to foreign authority is not alien to the U.S. Supreme Court. And there is clearly another level of interaction between the Justices and their counterparts abroad beyond citation. Examples include the apparent interest in remaining informed of the jurisprudential developments in other countries, participation in formal judicial conferences, international judicial organizations, speaking engagements, and literary ventures. The number and variety of these activities makes clear that the Justices of the Supreme Court are taking an active role in at least some elements of the emerging judicial community. Thus, the risk of lagging behind may be exaggerated.
In sum, when one looks past the anecdotal evidence and considers the verifiable metric of citation analysis, one finds good reason to approach the claims of Choudhry, Ginsburg, Justice Kirby, Justice LHeureux-Dubé, Lefler, Slaughter, and others with skepticism. Although not conducted here, a review of other national and constitutional courts' citation practices could prove illuminating as to what influence is wielded by the U.S. Supreme Court. In particular, citation analysis of the courts of countries such as Germany and Israel, with legal systems embracing judicial review while not being rooted entirely in common law, might prove particularly useful. Furthermore, there are other plausible explanations for trends in citation to the U.S. Supreme Court, and U.S. courts overall, that do not herald a decline in influence. Although not sufficient to dismiss claims of declining influence outright, the citation analysis and alternative explanations addressed in this note provide ample reason to seek additional data before drawing conclusions about the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court abroad.
